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Assessing Offset Quality in the Clean
Development Mechanism
by The Offset Quality Initiative*

T

Introduction

he Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), created
under the Kyoto Protocol, generates offsets through
investments in greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reduction,
avoidance, and sequestration projects in developing countries
(referred to as “non-Annex I Parties”). These offsets, called Certified Emission Reduction credits (“CERs”), are equivalent to a
reduction in one metric ton of carbon dioxide (“CO2”)1 emitted
to the atmosphere. Developed countries (referred to as “Annex
I Parties”) can use CERs to cost-effectively achieve their Kyoto
Protocol GHG reduction targets.
Over the past several years, the CDM has been subject to a
number of critiques, many of which call into question the program’s ability to generate high quality offsets. While the Offset Quality Initiative (“OQI”) neither endorses nor opposes the
CDM, this paper seeks to provide an impartial description of the
CDM and analyze its ability to ensure offset quality in the future.
Specifically, this paper analyzes the CDM through the prism of
the core criteria for offset quality outlined in OQI’s white paper
titled Ensuring Offset Quality: Integrating High Quality Greenhouse Gas Offsets Into North American Cap-and-Trade Policy.2
OQI considers the CDM process for addressing each criterion,
assesses whether the process is sufficient to ensure quality,
responds to related critiques of the CDM, and provides recommendations for improvement where appropriate.
Overall, OQI finds that the CDM’s processes perform sufficiently against most of our core offset quality criteria, and with
further refinement should be capable of performing sufficiently
against all criteria. The most significant quality issues in the
CDM historically have had to do with additionality and the reliability of independent third party verification. These issues are
common across all GHG offset programs and, in the case of the
CDM, can be addressed through streamlining and standardizing
the additionality tools and significantly restructuring the third
party verification system. On all other criteria, OQI finds that
the CDM, with some modification, can sufficiently ensure offset
quality.

Key Offset Quality Criteria
OQI’s “Offset Policy Design Principles and Recommendations”3 establishes a set of eight offset quality criteria. Offsets
should (1) be additional, (2) be based on a realistic baseline, (3)
be accurately quantified and monitored, (4) be independently
validated and verified, (5) be unambiguously owned, (6) address
leakage, (7) address permanence, and (8) do no net harm.
For each of these criteria, OQI has evaluated the CDM’s
performance, related critiques, and future ability to satisfy the
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criteria. The table at the end of this article summarizes the results
of this analysis.

OQI Criteria #1: Offsets Should Be Additional
Emission reductions resulting from offset projects should
be “in addition” to reductions that would have occurred without
the incentives provided by the existence of the offset program.
To determine if a project is “additional,” project developers,
auditors, and regulators generally rely on a series of tests, which
identify the regulatory, financial, technical, institutional, common practice, and/or other barriers to a project’s implementation.

CDM Process for Assuring Additionality
To ensure that offsets are additional, the CDM requires
project participants to apply three additionality tests:4 (1) a
Regulatory Test, (2) either a Barrier Test or an Investment Test,
and (3) a Common Practice Test. Project participants must apply
these tests on a project-by-project basis to assess the unique circumstances of each proposed activity.
The Regulatory Test identifies realistic and credible alternatives to the CDM project that are in compliance with all mandatory and enforceable legal and regulatory requirements, even
if those laws and regulations have objectives other than GHG
reductions. If the proposed project activity is the only viable
alternative, amongst all the practical alternatives that comply
with enforced regulations, then the proposed CDM project is not
additional.5
The Barrier Test examines whether there are hurdles preventing the project’s implementation in the absence of the CDM.
Barriers must be significant, realistic, credible, conservative, and
based on transparent and documented evidence. Examples could
* The Offset Quality Initiative consists of the following member organizations:
The Climate Trust, founded to manage a portfolio of compliance-grade carbon
projects as a result of Oregon’s leadership in passing the nation’s first legislation to limit carbon dioxide emissions, spearheads and leads the Offset Quality
Initiative; The Pew Center on Global Climate Change, established in 1998 as
a nonprofit, nonpartisan, and independent organization dedicated to providing
credible information, straight answers, and innovative solutions in the effort to
address global climate change; The Climate Action Reserve, a private nonprofit
organization addressing climate change and bringing together participants from
the government, environment and business sectors, directs the California Climate Action Registry, Climate Action Reserve and Center for Climate Action;
The Environmental Resource Trust, co-founder of the American Carbon Registry, which in 2008 was the most widely used voluntary carbon market registry in the world; Greenhouse Gas Management Institute, a registered nonprofit
organization, trains, certifies, and networks a global community of experts that
account, audit and manage GHG emissions based on world-class training and
professional standards; and The Climate Group, an independent nonprofit organization that works with government and business leaders to accelerate the
transition to a low-carbon economy, founded in 2004 with offices in the United
Kingdom, the United States, China, India, and Australia.
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include barriers related to securing investment or risk associated with unfamiliar technology.6 These same barriers must not
affect, or must affect less strongly, reasonable alternatives to the
project activity.
The Investment Test determines whether a CDM project
would occur without offset revenue. In the CDM, project participants typically make investment-related additionality arguments based on the internal rate of return (“IRR”) of a project,
both with and without CER income. If the project activity generates no revenue aside from the sale of CERs, then the project
participant applies a simple cost analysis to document project
costs and to demonstrate that there is at least one less expensive alternative to the project activity. If the activity does generate revenue in addition to CER sales, the project participant
must apply either (1) an investment
comparison analysis, which uses
a project-appropriate financial
indicator to compare the project’s performance to alternative
activities; or (2) a benchmark
analysis, which compares a standardized market indicator to the
CDM activity. If either analysis
indicates that there is a more
financially attractive option than
undertaking the CDM project,
the project passes this test. A
Sensitivity Test is also required
to ensure that the analytical
assumptions used are robust.7
Finally, the Common Practice Test measures the sectoral
and/or regional penetration of
the proposed CDM activity
(i.e., technology or practice). If
activities similar to the CDM
project activity are common, the
project participant must demonstrate that the project-specific circumstances are somehow unique; otherwise, the project is not
additional.8
If a project fails any of these tests (i.e., it is legally required,
is the most economically attractive approach and/or barrier-free,
or is common practice) the project is not additional and cannot
generate offsets under the CDM.9

cited Schneider’s paper widely for its assertion that up to twenty
percent of CERs—representing forty percent of CDM projects—may have been non-additional.11 Schneider’s paper also
argued that the additionality guidance provided under the CDM
with respect to barriers, investment, and common practice tests
was too subjective and/or insufficiently specific.12
The 2008 paper by Stanford University Professors Michael
Wara and David Victor titled A Realistic Policy on International
Carbon Offsets is another notable critique of the CDM’s ability to ensure project additionality.13 Wara and Victor largely
focused their criticism on the applications for CERs made by
nearly all new Chinese renewable energy capacity at the time,
despite the Chinese government’s national policy goals that
focused on increasing investment in renewable energy.14 The
implication of their argument was
that it would have been impossible for all these projects to
meet the CDM’s additionality test, since at least some of
the renewable energy capacity brought online at the time
must have been attributable to
China’s energy policy, not the
CDM.15 They claimed that if
the CDM’s additionality tests
could not sift out the additional
from non-additional projects in
this example, then they could
not sufficiently ensure offset
quality.16
Wara and Victor also criticized the concept of offsets
in general by asserting that
increasingly burdensome tests
would be required to sufficiently ensure additionality to an
acceptable level of offset quality,
and that such stringency would make the CDM too cumbersome
to function effectively.17 Ultimately, they declared that “enthusiasm [for offsets] is misplaced because any offset market of sufficient scale to provide substantial cost-control for a cap-and-trade
program will involve substantial issuance of credits that do not
represent real emissions reductions.”18

Critique: The CDM Does Not Adequately Ensure
Additionality

Finding(s): OQI finds that there have been valid concerns
about the efficacy of both the design and implementation of the
CDM’s measures to ensure additionality. However, the recent
rejection of a number of proposed Chinese renewable energy
CDM projects by the Executive Board (“EB”) (the body responsible for oversight of the CDM) on additionality grounds indicates that CDM executive leadership and staff have begun to
address at least some of the aforementioned quality critiques.
Furthermore, OQI believes that issues cited in the past concerning CDM additionality determinations are neither endemic

Overall, OQI finds that
the CDM’s processes
perform sufficiently
against most of our core
offset quality criteria, and
with further refinement
should be capable of
performing sufficiently
against all criteria.

A number of past critiques have questioned the effectiveness of these tests, or at least the consistency and adequacy of
their application by regulators. Of these, perhaps the most well
known critique was the November 2007 paper written by Lambert Schneider on behalf of the World Wildlife Fund, titled Is
the CDM Fulfilling its Environmental and Sustainable Development Objectives? An Evaluation of the CDM and Options for
Improvement.10 The media, academic literature, and trade press
Winter 2010

OQI Findings & Recommendations
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nor irreparable. Improvements in the past few years include
the introduction of both the Registration and Issuance Teams
(“RITs”) and additional secretariat staff that provide multiple
layers of project review, summarize submissions, and make
recommendations, all of which facilitate the CDM Executive
Board’s review and decision making process. The Executive
Board review and rejection rate for projects has increased significantly over the past two years.19 As the Executive Board
undertakes reforms to incorporate more objective, standardized criteria into additionality determinations, it will be possible
to create a program that both ensures offset quality and is not
overly burdensome or administratively complex.
Recommendation(s): Broadly speaking, CDM projects fall
into one of two categories, which largely dictate how difficult it
is to assess their additionality. For projects where CDM is the
sole or primary source of revenue, additionality is less challenging to determine because there are no other expected economic
incentives for the project besides the CDM.
Projects with multiple revenue streams are more challenging. For this category, the CDM could improve by implementing a more rigorous and standardized approach for determining
additionality, consistent with the recommendations made by
Lambert Schneider.
Standardized approaches determine additionality based on
a set of objective eligibility criteria, which consider the regulatory, financial, institutional, and technical conditions for a particular project type. Generally, standardized approaches involve
the establishment of performance benchmarks for both additionality and baselines. However, while a more standardized
approach to additionality can also help to promote offset quality, an entirely standardized approach would be challenging, if
not impossible, because of the diversity of developing country
contexts. Therefore, “hybrid” additionality assessments, which
combine elements of the current tests-based approach with more
project-type-specific standardized criteria, can help balance the
strengths and weaknesses of these respective processes. As the
CDM grows to meet increased global demand for international
offsets, a hybrid approach to additionality can help streamline the project cycle, increasing efficiency while maintaining
quality.
Providing more detailed guidance to both project participants and independent third party project auditors (referred to
as “Designated Operational Entities,” or “DOEs”) about how
to determine additionality for each project type, and providing
standardized investment and analysis tools, will improve the
quality of the CDM while also reducing transaction costs and
administrative burden. As the first large-scale GHG offset program in the world, the CDM is already incorporating some of
these recommendations as program administrators and participants learn through experience.

OQI Criteria #2: Offsets Should Be Based on a
Realistic Baseline
High quality offsets should be measured against a realistic baseline in order to achieve a transparent and conservative
27

estimation of a project’s GHG emission reduction, avoidance,
and/or removal. A baseline is an estimate of the GHG emissions
that would occur in the absence of the offset project. Whereas
additionality involves demonstrating that a project activity
would not have occurred in the absence of the CDM, baselines
establish the plausible GHG emissions scenario without the
project.

CDM Process for Establishing Baselines
Under the CDM, project participants establish baselines
according to guidelines set forth in an approved project methodology. A methodology defines the likely emissions sources and
sinks in the absence of a project. The CDM specifies the following three approaches for establishing baselines:
1. Determining that the most likely activity in the
absence of the project would be continuance of the
existing activity.
2. Determining if an economically attractive alternative
exists that is neither the existing activity nor the CDM
project. In this case, the emissions associated with the
most economically attractive alternative to the CDM
project would constitute the baseline.
3. In the absence of a clear economically attractive
alternative, the baseline is based on the average
emissions of other commonly implemented and high
performing projects in the sector. Projects must have
been undertaken in the past five years and have similar
geographic, economic, environmental, political, social,
and other characteristics.20
For example, the baseline scenario for a CDM project that
proposes to capture and flare landfill gas might involve a plausible expectation that the landfill owner would normally take no
action to reduce or capture methane at the site.21 In this case,
baseline emissions would equal the amount of methane released
from the site without any gas capture. However, this is a fairly
straightforward example and it is possible that a given project
will have multiple plausible baseline scenarios from which the
project participant must choose.

Critique: CDM Project-by-Project Baseline
Determinations Are Administratively Burdensome
Some market participants believe the CDM’s approach to
baseline determination is inadequately streamlined and deem
the process to be overly burdensome. Project participants have
argued that a more efficient alternative approach would be to
establish generic benchmarks or default emission factors for particular project types, which would allow for streamlined estimation of baseline emissions.
Recently, the CDM has begun to address this concern by
moving away from project-specific baseline scenarios, towards
a hybrid approach that combines both project-specific and
standardized evaluations. For example, the Executive Board
approved a methodology in 2008 for the manufacture of energyefficient refrigerators, which takes a benchmarked approach
to establishing project baselines. As opposed to other methodologies that would require direct measurement of energy
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

consumption, this methodology (“AM0070”) sets the baseline as
the manufacturing of “refrigerators with the specific electricity
consumption corresponding to the calculated benchmark for the
respective storage volume class.”22 In other words, the methodology provides a standardized baseline with a default factor for
calculating the energy savings of various refrigeration devices.
A degree of standardization is also underway for renewable
energy and energy efficiency projects, through the compilation
of standard baseline emission factors for electricity grids in several developing countries, such as India and South Africa.

OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): OQI finds that the CDM’s approach to baseline establishment is generally sufficient to ensure offset quality,
although a transition towards more standardized, benchmarked
baselines, where appropriate, could help increase administrative
efficiency. At the same time, OQI acknowledges that developing benchmark baselines requires a significant amount of data,
research, and work, particularly to ensure that they are current,
as well as contextually and regionally appropriate.
Recommendation(s): Standardization of baselines through
benchmarking for some types of projects may be appropriate
and more efficient in the CDM moving forward. The CDM trend
towards benchmarking baselines—as in the case of the AM0070
with efficient refrigerators—can streamline the project development process and reduce transaction costs and investor risk.
Similar to additionality, standardized baselines are not
appropriate for activities and/or regions with heterogeneous
characteristics that make accurate generalization difficult. Disadvantages to standardized baselines can include the significant
time and cost associated with developing rigorous benchmarks
across a broad range of project types, limits to the amount of
appropriate project types, and difficulties in accounting for different technological and market conditions across regions and
regulatory systems. In other words, while standardized baseline
scenarios may be appropriate in certain countries or sectors and
for certain project types, they may be inappropriate for those
with substantial project-specific considerations.

Offset Criteria #3: Offsets Should Be Accurately
Quantified & Monitored
Offsets should be accurately quantified and monitored to
ensure that only real, high-quality emission reductions receive
credits. To achieve accuracy, projects should have monitoring
plans that define how, when, and by whom data will be collected
and emissions quantified, using established standards.

CDM Process for Offset Quantification and
Monitoring
The CDM requires that an approved monitoring plan
for each project be included in its Project Design Document
(“PDD”).23 CDM methodologies lay out detailed rules and guidance on quantification and monitoring requirements for each
project type. Each project’s monitoring plan must specify monitoring and quality control procedures, necessary data for collection, measurement accuracy and calibration procedures, the type
Winter 2010

of measurement instruments, and who is responsible for monitoring. Plans must also address the monitoring of leakage and
be available to the public online.24 Prior to project registration,
independent auditors must validate monitoring plans.

Critique
In certain instances, there have been individual technical
issues or other problems with methodologies. However, revisions to methodologies have corrected these issues and, broadly
speaking, there have been no significant critiques of the CDM’s
ability to ensure quality offset quantification and monitoring, to
date.

OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): OQI finds that the CDM has strict criteria for
emission quantification and monitoring that sufficiently ensures
offset quality. Indeed, the CDM has served as a model for emissions quantification and monitoring procedures in subsequent
GHG offset programs and standards.
Recommendation(s): The CDM has a strong existing library of methodologies that include accepted monitoring and quantification formulas, and that have preceded most
other regional and international standards. In certain instances,
requiring the application of internationally recognized technical
standards to CDM monitoring plans could support greater standardization of data across projects and project types. Explicit
references to these standards also will give project participants
and auditors greater clarity on the requirements for project
implementation.

Offset Criteria #4: Offsets Should Be
Independently Validated & Verified
An independent and qualified third party, free from conflicts of interest, should audit (i.e., validate projects or verify
project performance) all offset projects to ensure accuracy and
impartiality. To avoid conflicts of interest, auditor compensation
should not depend on whether the project receives CER credits.
Regulatory offset systems should have accredited auditors and
procedures in place to review and re-accredit, suspend, or disqualify audit organizations on an ongoing basis.

CDM Process for Offset Validation and Verification
Independent third party auditors in the CDM are called Designated Operational Entities (“DOEs”) and are accredited by the
CDM Executive Board based on criteria relating largely to size,
technical competency, and management ability. DOEs are subject to random spot-checks and periodic review by the Executive
Board, and substandard work can lead to fines, suspension, or
revocation of a DOE’s accreditation.25
An independent auditor must validate the PDD (i.e., project validation) prior to registration of the project by the CDM.
Prior to CER issuance by the CDM, an independent auditor must
verify the emission reductions based on ex post data on project performance. Project participants contract DOEs to perform
these audits, and pay the DOEs for services directly. The use of
different DOEs26 at the validation and verification stages in the
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project cycle is intended to ensure that the second audit is not
biased by findings of the earlier audit.27

Critique: Some Independent Third Party Verifiers
(DOEs) Have Not Sufficiently Evaluated, Validated,
and Verified Projects to Date
Some third party verifiers under the CDM have been criticized for a lack of capacity and competency to undertake the
level of quality checks required to ensure offset quality. In addition, because DOEs compete with one another for business, there
has been concern that they could be driven to lower the quality
of their audits to remain competitive and profitable. Questions
surrounding potential conflicts of interest for DOEs also exist,
because project participants hire and then pay DOEs themselves.
One example of the issues surrounding third party verification emerged in November 2008, when the largest CDM project
auditor, Norway’s Det Norske Veritas (“DNV”), had its accreditation suspended by the Executive Board for five alleged nonconformities related to its validation and verification practices.28
The suspension meant that DNV could not submit projects for
registration or request issuance of CERs for clients. At least in
part, the suspension reflected a move by the Executive Board to
tighten rules and ensure that CDM projects meet more stringent
offset quality standards. A second verifier suspension, this time
of the firm SGS United Kingdom Limited (“SGS”), signifies
continued vigilance by the Executive Board.

OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): DNV’s suspension and later reinstatement, as
well as SGS’ recent suspension, indicate that procedures for
spot-checks and periodic evaluation as well as oversight of
DOEs by the Executive Board is improving. However, more
training, guidance, experience, and the development of standardized protocols for auditing are needed, as well as consensus
on what constitutes validation and/or verification best practices.
Some progress has been made in this regard, with the adoption
of the Validation and Verification Manual (“VVM”) by the
CDM Executive Board in 2008.29
Recommendation(s): Significant reforms are needed to
better train DOE staff, to align the incentive structures of third
party validation and verification, and to ensure greater oversight
of DOEs by the Executive Board.
Individuals employed by DOEs should be required to meet
a minimum level of training, modeled after the existing training
program for Expert Review Team members that review national
inventories submitted under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. To be
on a verification team, individual auditors should have to complete this training and pass an exam, supplementing this training
with their own training on internal systems and procedures.
To align incentives and avoid potential conflicts of interest,
a neutral party could assign DOEs to projects instead of project
participants hiring DOEs themselves. For example, the Executive Board could assign DOEs, operating under a predetermined
fee structure, to projects.
29

In addition, the ability of the CDM Accreditation Panel
(which oversees DOEs) to assess whether DOEs have the capacity and competency to justify accreditation could be strengthened
through mandatory training and testing for Accreditation Panel
members and support personnel. To accomplish this, employees
must be specifically hired and trained to achieve this goal.
Finally, continual updates and improvements to the Validation and Verification Manual are essential to ensure that DOEs,
project participants, and the Executive Board have a clear understanding of the materiality of each requirement to the quality of
a project’s validation and verification.30

Offset Criteria #5: Offsets Should Be
Unambiguously Owned
Offsets should have a single owner with clear rights to the
credits so that the emission reductions they represent are not
claimed twice. “Double-counting” can be further prevented by
ensuring credits are serialized and accounted for in a registry
where transfer of ownership can be clearly documented.

CDM Process for Ensuring Unambiguous Ownership
Before any offset project activity can move forward, the
Designated National Authority (“DNA”)31 of the host country
must approve the project on behalf of that nation’s sovereign
government. The DNA is thereby responsible for assigning
unambiguous ownership rights to emission reduction credits to
project participants.
Furthermore, all CDM credits have individual serial numbers and a UN registry that meets international best practice
standards for accounting and transactions, like those used in
financial banking systems. The registry uses unique account
numbers for all participants, and participants may hold each
CER in one account at a time. Information in the registry is publicly available on the Internet.32

Critique
No significant critiques exist to date on the CDM’s ability to
ensure unambiguous ownership.

OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): OQI finds that the CDM is generally sufficient
to ensure that offset credits are unambiguously owned. In particular, because the CDM gives developing countries the ultimate
power to approve offset issuance, the system is structured to
respect domestic sovereignty and ensure clear ownership under
domestic law, while simultaneously ensuring that international
ownership transactions are clear and credible. Furthermore, the
serialization and registry accounting system promotes unambiguous ownership by allowing credit transfers and retirements in a
transparent fashion.
Recommendation(s): Requiring host country recognition
of CER ownership creates a robust mechanism for establishing unambiguous credit ownership and for prevention of double-counting. Improving national-level governance structures
through training and capacity-building would help DNAs do an
even better job of avoiding any ambiguous ownership issues that
may occur in the future.
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Offset Criteria #6: Offsets Should Address
Leakage
Leakage is an increase in emissions outside of an offset
project’s boundaries that occurs as a direct result of the project’s
implementation. To account for leakage, methodologies should
define a “project boundary” which specifies the GHG sources
and sinks for which project participants are responsible. Methodologies also should explain how the project will quantify any
significant changes in emissions outside the project boundary.
Offset programs should require that project participants evaluate
potential leakage effects, and that monitoring plans account for
actual effects over the life of a project.

credits that expire at a predetermined time. Once a credit expires,
the owner must replace it with another valid credit or emission
allowance unit.34 For example, if a country uses a reforestation
credit to comply with its obligations under the Kyoto protocol
in 2010 and the credit expires in 2020, the country will have
to submit a replacement credit or allowance in 2020 to remain
in compliance with its 2010 obligations. A significant disadvantage of temporary crediting is that it treats all forestry carbon
as short-lived, even where reversals may not have occurred.
The result is increased financial risk and uncertainty for buyers,
which creates a disincentive for project participants to invest in
forestry projects.

CDM Process for Addressing Leakage

Critique

In general, project participants must either demonstrate that
leakage is unlikely to occur, or monitor and quantify unavoidable leakage and deduct it from the total credited emission reductions by using procedures and formulas prescribed by the project
methodology. For example, projects that use wood waste instead
of fossil fuel in thermal boilers can cause leakage if wood waste
is in short supply, and other local wood-fired boilers switch back
to fossil fuels. The CDM methodology (“AM-0036”) for this
kind of project requires project participants to demonstrate that
wood waste is abundant. If such a demonstration is not possible,
project participants must calculate the increase in fossil fuel
emissions likely to occur at other boilers as a result, and must
deduct this from the total creditable reductions.33

No significant critiques exist to date on the CDM’s ability to
ensure permanence. However, critiques do exist about the efficacy of temporary crediting with respect to promoting investment in carbon sequestration projects.

Critique
No significant critiques exist to date on the CDM’s ability
to address leakage.

OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): OQI finds that the CDM has methodologies that
estimate leakage conservatively for most project types, and its
approach to addressing leakage is generally sufficient to ensure
offset quality.
Recommendation(s): OQI recommends that the CDM
continue to use a conservative approach in identifying and mitigating leakage issues, that it require all project types to address
leakage, and that it provide methodological guidelines for estimating leakage at a level commensurate with the project type’s
complexity and risk.

Offset Criteria #7: Offsets Should Address
Permanence
For certain project types, there is a risk that emission reductions generated are subject to reversal, and therefore could fail to
offset emissions permanently. For example, a forest fire, weather
event, or pest attack could release into the atmosphere carbon
stored by a forestry project. Therefore, regulatory regimes
should address permanence to ensure the minimization of loss in
the event of a reversal.

CDM Process for Addressing Permanence
In the case of afforestation/reforestation (“AR”) projects,
the CDM addresses permanence concerns by issuing temporary
Winter 2010

OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): OQI finds that, while temporary crediting is
sufficient to ensure offset quality, the CDM’s current approach
may be overly conservative, as it creates investor uncertainty
and has led to minimal investments in forestry projects under the
CDM to date.
Recommendation(s): OQI recommends investigating
alternate ways to address permanence. For example, policy
mechanisms that address reversal risk could provide more market certainty than temporary crediting mechanisms. Some GHG
programs in voluntary and pre-compliance markets are exploring and testing buffer pools and the use of insurance and other
financial products as alternatives to temporary crediting. Buffer
pools, for instance, address reversal risk by evaluating the risk
profile of a project, and then requiring project participants to set
aside a portion of the offsets, based on the results of applying
a methodology to determine risk and buffer size, into a shared
buffer pool. In the event of a reversal, project participants use
credits from this pool to account for negated sequestered tons.
As another example, insurance products work much like other
traditional types of insurance, addressing risk by making the
project whole by guaranteeing a replacement price for offsets
equivalent to the loss. Although applying these mechanisms in
many developing countries may be challenging, from a market
and investment perspective they could provide a more efficient,
certain, and cost-effective approach than temporary crediting.

Offset Criteria #8: Offset Projects Should Do No
Net Harm
Offset projects should not cause or contribute to adverse
effects on human health or the environment, and should seek
to provide health and environmental co-benefits whenever
possible.

CDM Process for Ensuring No Net Harm
To ensure that offset projects do no net harm, the CDM
requires project participants to sponsor a stakeholder consultation
process during the project design phase. During the consultation
30

process, submissions of public comments on the project activity
must be solicited, and in-person stakeholder meetings must be
held in the local community.35 Project participants are required
to undertake good faith efforts to publicize the event and make
materials available in the language of local constituents. The
PDD must include a summary of any stakeholder comments
received during the public comment period and describe any
anticipated environmental, economic, and/or social impacts. The
project must then be approved by the host country government
and be found consistent with its sustainable development goals,
as well as environmental and other regulations.36

Critique: CDM Projects Sometimes Cause Local
Environmental and/or Social Harm, and/or Fail to
Promote Sustainable Development
A small number of CDM projects have come under criticism
for causing local environmental or social harm. For example,
a number of environmental non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”) including International Rivers, the Center for Biological Diversity (“CBD”), and the Natural Resources Defense
Council (“NRDC”) submitted comments to oppose the validation
of a hydroelectric project in Panama sponsored by AES Corporation. The NGOs claimed the project would have threatened a
biologically rich World Heritage Site and the indigenous Ngobe
tribe.37
Another related critique frequently levied against the CDM
is that it has failed to meet one of its primary objectives: to assist
developing countries in achieving sustainable development.
While failing to promote sustainable development is not necessarily equivalent to doing net harm, it is worth mentioning in this
paper because of the prevalence of this criticism in debates over
the CDM to date.
According to Schneider:
The actual impact of CDM projects on sustainable
development is difficult to assess because it depends
on the definition of sustainable development which is
defined by most countries in very broad terms. Many
countries have established and published criteria to
assess whether a project contributes to sustainable
development. However, they are often very general
. . . [F]ew [projects] comply with criteria that are related
to the achievement of the Millennium Development
Goals. For example, many CDM projects, directly or
indirectly, reduce air pollution or contribute to the diffusion of environmentally sound technologies, whereas
only very few projects directly contribute to poverty
alleviation.38

OQI Findings & Recommendations
Finding(s): OQI finds that the CDM’s approach to preventing net harm is generally sufficient to ensure offset quality by
creating opportunities for public participation and giving host
countries recourse to reject projects if they fail to consider and
incorporate stakeholder concerns and sustainable development
goals. However, OQI acknowledges that ensuring absolute no
net harm of all offset projects is difficult, since in all cases some
31

trade-offs are likely to exist. For example, a landfill gas capture
system may reduce a number of trace pollutants that can cause
unpleasant odor and smog due to ground-level ozone. However,
it may also displace impoverished people who rely on scavenging the landfill as the basis of their livelihood.
On the question of whether the CDM sufficiently contributes
to sustainable development, OQI generally concurs with Lambert
Schneider that such a determination is difficult to make because
definitions of sustainable development differ significantly
between countries, and are often broad, vague, or multifarious.
Recommendation(s): The CDM Executive Board should
continue to work towards ensuring that offset projects do no
net harm. Programs to engage and educate local stakeholders
so they understand the purpose and impacts of offset projects
will improve the CDM’s ability to prevent net harm. Improving
national-level governance structures, through training and capacity-building, would further help DNAs develop and apply their
own sustainable development criteria and evaluation processes.

Conclusion
OQI finds that, with some improvements, the CDM can provide an acceptable assurance of project additionality and baselines. Recent trends towards standardization and benchmarking
of both additionality and baselines should continue to improve
quality. It is important to note that while standardized approaches
are often advocated in principle, in reality some project types are
less amenable to standardization, and variations across regions
and contexts require consideration and flexibility. OQI notes
that expert judgment will remain an important complement to
standardized approaches.
There are still challenges to address and further improvements to make. Project-by-project additionality determinations
remain administratively burdensome and susceptible to subjectivity and inconsistency; as such, movement towards a hybrid
approach would help streamline the process and increase efficiency while maintaining quality. Significant improvements to
the third party verification process are needed, and potential
conflicts of interest could be minimized if DOEs are not selected
by project participants. New policy mechanisms that address
reversal risk can ensure permanence without constraining the
market.
On the whole, based on the assessment criteria established in
Ensuring Offset Quality: Integrating High Quality Greenhouse
Gas Offsets Into North American Cap-and-Trade Policy,39 OQI
finds that the CDM is generally able to ensure sufficient offset
quality. As our recommendations continue to be addressed, particularly those regarding additionality determination and third
party validation/verification, the CDM could provide quality
international offset credits for use in a future U.S. cap-and-trade
program.
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APPENDIX 1: The CDM Project Cycle
The CDM process involves two stages: project design and project implementation. The CDM requires a number of documents at
various points in both stages to demonstrate that a project meets the CDM’s requirements.

Stage I: Project Design

Stage I begins with the project planning phase, where project participants prepare a document describing the project, and
get written approval from each country involved.40 Among other
things, the written approval must show that the CDM project
supports the host country’s sustainable development goals.
In the project document preparation phase, project participants complete a Project Design Document (“PDD”). The PDD
is a comprehensive document that explains how the project meets
the CDM’s additionality tests for the activity in question. The
PDD also describes the project’s geographic boundary, how the
GHG reductions will be monitored and estimated, and the period
of time the project participant seeks to receive credits.41 Further, the PDD summarizes any stakeholder comments received
during the public comment period, describes any anticipated
environmental, economic, and/or social impacts, and shows the
average annual reductions and total CER volume expected over
the project’s creditable lifetime. In general, project participants
develop projects according to standardized project “methodologies,” or blueprints, which the CDM Executive Board approves.
These methodologies outline the steps for undertaking a variety
of creditable GHG reducing activities.
Before the project can be officially “registered” by the
Executive Board (“EB”), an independent third party auditor,
called a Designated Operational Entity (“DOE”),42 must review
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Stage II: Project Implementation

the project activity and documentation against the requirements
of the CDM. The DOE checks all information in the PDD to
ensure transparency and rigor in data, calculations, and additionality arguments, and may come back to the project participant
with requests for clarifications. The DOE also conducts a site
visit to the project to ground-truth the project documentation,
and if they find that the project meets all established requirements, they submit a validation report to the EB, which may register or reject the project, or request clarifications if necessary.
Once the EB registers the project, the implementation stage
begins with the monitoring phase. Project participants must collect and analyze data from the project, according to standardized procedures established in the project’s methodology. The
project participant must continually monitor the project over its
creditable lifetime and calculate the GHG reductions the project
has achieved to successfully receive CER credits.
In the verification and certification phase, project participants again retain a DOE, this time to verify the project’s GHG
reductions as documented by the data acquired during the project monitoring process. Once the DOE reviews and verifies the
data, they submit paperwork certifying the accuracy of the GHG
reductions to the EB, and request issuance of CER credits to the
project participant.
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Offsets Should Be
Transparent/
Based on a Realistic conservative
Baseline
project-specific
assessment

2.

Inadequately
streamlined;
administratively
burdensome

Does not ensure offset
quality
· Additionality
guidance too
subjective and
vague; applied
inconsistently  

Regulatory, Barrier
or Investment, and
Common Practice
Tests

Offsets Should Be
Additional

CRITIQUES OF CDM

CDM
PROCESS

1.

OQI Quality
Offset Criteria

OQI RECOMMENDATIONS

Generally sufficient to ensure offset quality
· Administrative burden is being reduced where
possible, but more streamlining is necessary
· Development of benchmark baselines requires
a significant amount of data, research, and
work to ensure they are current as well as
contextually and regionally appropriate

Benchmark baselines in appropriate sectors
· Transitioning towards more standardized,
benchmarked baselines, where appropriate,
would streamline project development and
promote administrative efficiency

Processes for determining additionality in
Streamline existing process, standardize tools,
projects where there are multiple revenue streams provide more detailed guidance
should be improved
· For projects with multiple revenue streams,
· Valid concerns exist about the design and
implement a more rigorous and standardized
implementation of measures to ensure
approach to determining additionality
additionality
· For all projects, provide more detailed
· Recent rejection of certain project types
guidance to project participants and
indicate improvement in implementing these
independent third party project auditors
measures
· Provide standardized investment and analysis
· It is possible to modify the CDM so that it
tools
ensures sufficient offset quality, while not also · Develop “hybrid” additionality assessments,
being overly burdensome or administratively
which combine elements of the current
complex
tests-based approach with more project-type· It is easier to determine additionality where
specific benchmarks, to help balance the
CDM is the sole/primary source of revenue to
strengths and weaknesses of the standardized
the project
processes recommended above
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Table 1: Summary of Analysis Results
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Offsets Should
Be Accurately
Quantified &
Monitored

Offsets Should
Be Independently
Validated &
Verified

3.

4.

OQI Quality
Offset Criteria

Validation and verification processes should be
significantly restructured to ensure offset quality
· Procedures for spot checks and periodic
evaluation have been taken seriously and
oversight of DOEs by the CDM Executive
Board (“EB”) is progressing, but still needs
improvement
· Standardized protocols on the practice
of auditing are needed. Adoption of the
Validation and Verification Manual (“VVM”)
marks progress in this regard

To date, DOEs have
not sufficiently audited
projects due to:
· Lack of capacity
· Conflicts of interest
· Competition

Independent third
party auditors
called Designated
Operational
Entities (“DOEs”)
are contracted to
validate and verify
all projects
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Generally sufficient to ensure offset quality but
could be improved
· CDM has strict criteria for emission
quantification and monitoring
· The CDM predates, and has served as a model
for, emission quantification and monitoring
under other offset programs

CRITIQUES OF
CDM

Monitoring plan
No significant critiques
must be included
in Project Design
Document (“PDD”)

CDM
PROCESS

Align incentive structure, improve training for
auditors, and improve Executive Board oversight
· Require a mandatory training and testing
program for individuals employed by DOEs
· Auditors could be assigned to projects
instead of selected and contracted by project
participants
· Train and test DOE accreditation assessors
before they evaluate the capabilities of an
audit organization
· Enhance resources for DOE oversight under
the CDM
· Continual updates and improvements to
the VVM are essential to ensure DOEs,
project participants, and the CDM Executive
Board have a clear understanding of what is
material to the quality of PDD validation and
verification

In certain instances, monitoring could be
improved by requiring application of recognized
technical standards to CDM monitoring plans
· Monitoring and quantification requirements
must retain some degree of flexibility and
diversity across different methodologies
· In certain instances, requiring the application
of internationally recognized technical
standards to CDM monitoring plans could
improve data quality
· Explicit references to recognized technical
specifications and standards will also reduce
ambiguity for project participants and
auditors

OQI RECOMMENDATIONS

35

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Offsets Should
Address
Permanence

7.

Offsets Should Do
No Net Harm

Offsets Should
Address Leakage

6.

8.

Offsets Should Be
Unambiguously
Owned

5.

OQI Quality
Offset Criteria

No significant critiques

“Temporary”
designation creates
investment uncertainty

Project boundary,
description, and
monitoring of
potential leakage
required in PDD
and deducted from
issuable credits

Temporary
credits issued
for afforestation/
reforestation
(“AR”) projects

Some projects
do harm; not all
projects contribute
to CDM goal of
promoting sustainable
development

No significant critiques

Serialization on
registry; offset tons
issued approved
by Designated
National Authority
(“DNA”), i.e., the
host country

Required public
comment period;
description
of potential
environmental/
economic/social
impacts in PDD

CRITIQUES OF
CDM

CDM
PROCESS

Explore possible alternative approaches to
address reversal risk
· Decrease use of temporary crediting to
encourage investment in forestry projects
· Allow for a range of policy mechanisms
(e.g., pooled risk in a buffer account, project
insurance) to address reversal risk, which
will help promote greater certainty and avoid
constraining the market

Continue to use conservative approach in
estimating leakage

Improve national level governance structures
through training and capacity-building to help
DNAs do an even better job of addressing any
ambiguous ownership issues that may occur
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Various approaches exist to ensure more
Generally sufficient to ensure offset quality
· Trade-offs mean achieving 100% no net harm projects contribute to sustainable development
· Improve national-level governance structures
is difficult in practice
through training and capacity-building to
· National sustainable development goals can be
help DNAs develop their own sustainable
varied and/or vague
development criteria and evaluation processes
· It is difficult to determine whether CDM
· Educate local stakeholders to promote
sufficiently contributes to sustainable
empowerment and understanding of offset
development
projects
· Provide clearer guidance on how to meet
sustainable development requirements

Generally sufficient to ensure offset quality, but
possibly too stringent
· Temporary nature of credits discourages
investment in forestry projects

Generally sufficient to ensure offset quality but
could be improved
· Methodologies to estimate leakage are
conservative for most project types

Generally sufficient to ensure quality
· The system is structured to respect domestic
sovereignty and ensure clear ownership under
domestic law, while simultaneously ensuring
that international ownership transactions are
clear and credible
· Serialization and a registry accounting system
promote unambiguous ownership by allowing
credits to be transferred and retired in a
transparent fashion
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Endnotes: Assessing Offset Quality in the Clean Development
Mechanism
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The Kyoto Protocol applies to five other greenhouse gases besides CO2,
each with a different “warming power.” So that all the gases can be represented
by a common unit, each is converted into a “carbon dioxide equivalent.” For
example, methane (CH4) has a global warming potential 21 times that of CO2
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2 Offset Quality Initiative, Ensuring Offset Quality: Integrating High
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attach/charts7.0.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
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12 Id. at 45.
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15 See id. at 14.
16 See id.
17 See id. at 16-17.
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20 See Ram M. Shrestha Et Al., United Nations Environment Programme,
Baseline Methodologies For Clean Development Mechanism Projects 20-21
(Myung-Kyoon Lee ed., UNEP Riso Center 2005), available at http://cd4cdm.
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Monitoring Reports, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Issuance/MonitoringReports/index.
html (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) (providing an online listing of all the Monitoring
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See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Clean
Development Mechanism–Executive Board, Procedure For Accrediting Operational Entities by the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism
4, EB 34, Annex 1, V. 08 (2007), available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/034/
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Convention on Climate Change, Clean Development Mechanism–Executive
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29 The VVM is a guide designed to assist DOEs with their validation and verification work, by promoting quality and consistency in all DOE reports, and to
ensure that each project meets all the relevant requirements of the CDM.
30 Materiality is based on the concept that there are certain omissions or errors
in data that are not relevant to the decision of whether or not to issue CERs to a
project.
31 A Designated National Authority (“DNA”) is the national agency that is
responsible for approving CDM projects. For any CDM project to move forward, the DNA from each country involved in the project must give their written
approval in the form of a Letter of Approval (“LoA”).
32 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, Can., Nov. 28–Dec.10, 2005, Appendix D: Clean
Development Mechanism Registry Requirements 27, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/
Add.1 (March 30, 2006) [hereinafter Conference of the Parties], available at
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/COPMOP/08a01.pdf#page=27.
33 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Clean
Development Mechanism–Executive Board, Approved Baseline and Monitoring Methodology AM0036, V. 3 (2009), available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/
UserManagement/FileStorage/CUOTDYZSL8EV3F0WR96MXKIJA271BQ.
34 See Conference of the Parties, supra note 32, at 61.
35 See id. at 14 (exemplifying the stakeholder consultation process).
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37 See Press Release, Center for Biological Diversity, AES Corporation Participating in the Demise of the Ngobe Tribe of Panama and La Amistad Biosphere
Reserve (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/
press_releases/2009/la-amistad-04-23-2009.html.
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39 See Ensuring Offset Quality, supra note 2.
40 Projects must be in countries that have approved the Kyoto Protocol.
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no option for renewal.
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of conducting credible and independent assessments (i.e., without any conflicts
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